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Consolidating and revitalizing enlargement:   
further insights from MAXCAP1
Key recommendations
• The European Union (EU) needs to develop more effective and more flexible instruments for prevent-
ing democratic backsliding among its member states. The current Article 7 sanctions are not suffi-
ciently credible because of the near-unanimity requirement. Post-accession sanctions should combine 
the codification of a democracy and good governance acquis, impartial assessment (e.g. by the Venice 
Commission or the European Court of Justice), and a range of limited, preferably financial sanctions.
• The EU needs to deepen its mode of economic integration and develop mechanisms to anticipate 
and alleviate negative consequences of rules transfer as it expands trade liberalization and regulatory 
alignment to the Eastern Partnership countries.
• The EU’s structural and regional policies need to be reoriented to create better preconditions for in-
vestment and growth in more backward regions of the new member states.
• EU member state governments and institutions should approach and engage citizens and grass-roots 
movements directly in an open and fact-based dialogue at the early stages of an enlargement process. 
Communication and debate should emphasize common European values and principles, including the 
rule of law, which are shared throughout the member states.
• The ‘new approach’ matches well with citizens’ core concerns about enlargement but needs to work 
more bottom-up in cooperation with civil society organizations and monitor potential unintended 
effects of new institutions designed to strengthen the judiciary but actually providing new venues for 
political manipulation.
• The same is true for the use of the post-accession Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) in 
Bulgaria and Romania. In addition, the EU should avoid measures that undermine the legitimacy of 
the CVM – such as the questionable issue-linkage with Schengen accession that some member states 
made to attach material incentives to the CVM.
 
1 The brief draws upon the findings of the EU-funded research consortium “Maximizing the integration capacity of 
the European Union: Lessons of and prospects for enlargement and beyond” (MAXCAP) (http://maxcap-project.
eu). The MAXCAP Policy Task Force for this policy brief included Frank Schimmelfennig.
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introduction
Over the past three years, MAXCAP has analyzed the internal and external integration capacity of the EU 
in relation to the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. Internal integration capacity refers to the capacity of the 
EU to integrate new member states into its political, legal, and economic system, to avoid disruption, and 
further cohesion in the EU. External integration capacity, in turn, denotes the capacity of the EU to integrate 
non-member states by strengthening their ability to become members, by aligning their institutions and 
policies with those of the EU and by promoting stability in its neighbourhood.
This policy brief builds on and complements MAXCAP’s Policy Brief No. 2.2 We identify three sets of findings 
on the state of EU integration capacity and general policy recommendations. First, internal integration ca-
pacity has proven strong at the organizational level of the EU. Second, and at the same time, political and 
economic cohesion and convergence at the level of member states (and beyond) has been more limited and 
unbalanced. Third, external integration capacity has weakened.
The focus of the policy brief is to describe which EU strategies and policies have worked well and less well 
in the past (or have had unintended effects) – and should either be maintained, applied more broadly, or 
reconsidered. It is an important caveat that we can generally not claim with confidence that policies, which 
worked in one context, will also work in another context – or that untried policies will work better than failed 
policies. But we can at least point to issues and areas, in which policy reform is needed.
institutional integration capacity
Internal integration capacity at the level of EU institutions and policies has proven strong. According to our 
findings, the EU’s new member states have not disrupted but integrated themselves successfully into the EU’s 
political and legal systems. There is no evidence that Eastern enlargement has led to institutional gridlock and 
loss of decision-making capacity. Whereas there is some evidence that the new member states have distinct 
preferences from the older member states in a few policy areas, they are seldom able to act as a cohesive 
group, let alone derail the decision-making process.3 Nor has Eastern enlargement led to a deterioration 
of compliance with EU law. To the contrary, the Central and Eastern European new member states have on 
average a better compliance record than both the old member states and the new member states in earlier 
enlargement rounds. This fact is best explained by the legacy of accession conditionality.4 Moreover, efficient 
transposition does not come at the price of weak implementation with regard to practical application of EU 
2  MAXCAP Policy Task Force (2016) ‘Reinvigorating the Enlargement Process and Strengthening the EU’s Integration 
Capacity: Insights from MAXCAP’, MAXCAP Policy Brief No. 2, “Maximizing the integration capacity of the Europe-
an Union: Lessons of and prospects for enlargement and beyond” (MAXCAP), Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin.
3 Toshkov, D. (2015) ‘The Effects of the Eastern Enlargement on the Decision-Making Capacity of the European Uni-
on’, MAXCAP Working Paper No. 5, “Maximizing the integration capacity of the European Union: Lessons of and 
prospects for enlargement and beyond” (MAXCAP), Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin.
4 Sedelmeier, U. and Börzel, T. A. (2016) ‘Compliance with European Union Law in the New Member States after 
the Eastern Enlargement’, MAXCAP Working Paper No. 19, “Maximizing the integration capacity of the European 
Union: Lessons of and prospects for enlargement and beyond” (MAXCAP), Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin.
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law on the ground. Except for the area of social policy, the new member states do not lag behind the old 
member states in practical implementation.5 Finally, the new member states have converged towards normal 
levels of differentiated integration in the EU – especially when compared to the benchmark of the Southern 
member states, which are most similar in wealth and capacity to the Eastern members.6 We conclude that, 
with regard to the EU’s institutions of decision-making, legal integration, and policy implementation, there is 
no identifiable need for reforms to enhance the integration capacity of the EU.
Political and economic integration capacity
Cohesion and convergence among EU member states and beyond have been limited and unbalanced. This is 
true for both the broader political and economic integration. 
Political integration
Whereas democracy and governance effectiveness have improved overall in Eastern Europe, the countries of 
Central Europe, Southeast Europe, and Post-Soviet Europe have been moving on distinct paths and unable to 
catch up with the old member states. EU accession conditionality has had a positive impact on the political 
development of candidate countries. Unless the EU offers membership, however, it does not produce any 
systematic effects in its neighbouring countries. Moreover, the EU’s capacity to improve democracy and gov-
ernance effectiveness weakens again, once candidate countries become members.7 
In addition to maintaining the credibility of accession conditionality in the candidate countries (see below), 
the EU needs to do two things. On the one hand, it should signal to non-candidate countries that they have a 
general accession perspective – even if it is distant. On the other hand, the EU should develop more effective 
and more flexible instruments for preventing democratic backsliding among its member states. The current 
Article 7 sanctions are not sufficiently credible because of the near-unanimity requirement in the European 
Council and party-politically motivated protection of illiberal governments in the European Parliament.8 
Whether the newly established rule-of-law mechanism will be effective remains to be seen. Accession con-
ditionality derives its credibility from clear legal foundations, an apolitical, technocratic assessment mecha-
nism, and tangible incentives. Post-accession conditionality could build on the same model and combine the 
5 Zhelyazkova, A.; Kaya, C. and Schrama, R. (2016) ‘Notified and Substantive Compliance with EU Law in Enlarged 
Europe: Evidence from Four Policy Areas’, MAXCAP Working Paper No. 21, “Maximizing the integration capacity of 
the European Union: Lessons of and prospects for enlargement and beyond” (MAXCAP), Berlin: Freie Universität 
Berlin.
6 Schimmelfennig, F. and Winzen, T. (2016) ‘Eastern Enlargement and Differentiated Integration: Towards Normali-
zation’, MAXCAP Working Paper No. 20, “Maximizing the integration capacity of the European Union: Lessons of 
and prospects for enlargement and beyond” (MAXCAP), Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin.
7 Börzel, T. A. and Schimmelfennig, F. (2016) ‘Coming Together or Drifting Apart? The EU’s Political Integration Ca-
pacity in Eastern Europe’, MAXCAP Working Paper No. 23, “Maximizing the integration capacity of the European 
Union: Lessons of and prospects for enlargement and beyond” (MAXCAP), Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin.
8 Sedelmeier, U. (2016) ‘Protecting Democracy inside the European Union? The Party Politics of Sanctioning Backsli-
ding in the European Parliament’, MAXCAP Working Paper No. 27, “Maximizing the integration capacity of the Eu-
ropean Union: Lessons of and prospects for enlargement and beyond” (MAXCAP), Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin.
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codification of a democracy and good governance acquis beyond the general principles listed in the Treaty, 
impartial assessment (e.g. by the Venice Commission or the European Court of Justice), and a range of lim-
ited, preferably financial sanctions to be decided by a qualified majority. 
The Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, a post-accession instrument to promote judicial reform and 
the fights against corruption and organized crime in Bulgaria and Romania, has been useful but of limited 
effect. Our research suggests that its impact has been most noticeable when preventing or reducing assaults 
on existing institutional achievements. Moreover, it provided a platform for committed domestic actors to 
instigate domestic debate and exert pressure for reforms. At the same time, the institutional focus of the 
CVM is insufficient to address problems, such as corruption, which are deeply rooted in society. We therefore 
propose a stronger orientation of the CVM towards the support of civil society. Finally, since the power of the 
CVM relies primarily on the legitimacy of the EU as an institution, measures that undermine the legitimacy 
are detrimental to its impact – such as the selective use of the CVM towards Bulgaria and Romania, the ques-
tionable issue-linkage with Schengen accession that some member states made to attach material incentives 
to the CVM.9 
Economic integration
Regarding the EU’s economic integration capacity, our findings are equally ambivalent. The EU has created 
opportunities for trade, investment, and regulatory improvement but at the same time exposed the weaker 
economies of the East to market pressures on non-competitive industries and backward regions.10 Somewhat 
surprisingly, convergence to EU requirements of efficient judiciary increases the chances of social conver-
gence. The successful transfer of EU rules has also had a positive effect on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 
and labor productivity. As a combined effect of improved institutional conditions and the changing invest-
ment strategies of the largest European multinational firms, the strongest economies of Eastern and Central 
Europe have converged to the core countries at the level of the structure of their production and export. In 
the Eastern neighbourhood, however, such assistance has not been forthcoming. As long as governments in 
this region could pick and choose the extent and areas of integration, as they could under the initial European 
Neighbourhood Policy, this lack of support was less problematic than it is under the comprehensive free trade 
regime of the Eastern Partnership. In order to avoid destabilizing non-member countries further economi-
cally – and, ultimately, politically – the EU needs to deepen its mode of economic integration and develop 
mechanisms to anticipate and alleviate negative consequences of rule transfer.11  
9 Dimitrov, G.; Haralampiev, K. and Stoychev, S. (2016) ‘The Adventure of the CVM in Bulgaria and Romania’, MAXCAP 
Working Paper No. 29, “Maximizing the integration capacity of the European Union: Lessons of and prospects for 
enlargement and beyond” (MAXCAP), Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin.
 Sedelmeier, U. and Lacatus, C. (2016) ‘Compliance with the CVM’s Anti-Corruption Demands in Bulgaria and Ro-
mania’, MAXCAP Working Paper No. 19, “Maximizing the integration capacity of the European Union: Lessons of 
and prospects for enlargement and beyond” (MAXCAP), Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin. 
10 Bruszt, L.; Langbein, J.; Vukov, V.; Bayram, E. and Markiewicz, O. (2015) ‘The Developmental Impact of the EU 
Integration Regime: Insights from the Automotive Industry in Europe’s Peripheries’, MAXCAP Working Paper No. 
16, “Maximizing the integration capacity of the European Union: Lessons of and prospects for enlargement and 
beyond” (MAXCAP), Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin.
11 Bruszt, L. and Langbein, J. (2016) ‘Varieties of Disembedded Liberalism. EU Integration Strategies in the Eastern 
Peripheries of Europe’, MAXCAP Working Paper No. 26, “Maximizing the integration capacity of the European 
Union: Lessons of and prospects for enlargement and beyond” (MAXCAP), Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin.
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Not all is well in the new member states either. In the absence of post-accession policies that could address 
the developmental problems of the Eastern new members in a European context, economic convergence is 
based primarily on the availability of cheap highly skilled labor, preventing any considerable convergence to 
the core countries at the level of consumption.12 While the EU’s cohesion funds have contributed to the new 
members’ wealth, they also increased the gap between more and less advanced regions as well as the gap be-
tween the central state and local governments. This has resulted in part from the increasing focus of Cohesion 
Policy on efficient spending and the co-financing requirements.13 The EU’s structural and regional policies 
thus need to be redirected to create better preconditions for investments and growth in more backward re-
gions. This would imply a reduction of co-financing requirements and a revival of the decentralization agenda.
enlargement strategy
At a time when the EU faces new geopolitical challenges as a result of the Ukrainian crisis and the refugee 
crisis, the enlargement process has largely stalled in the Western Balkans, Turkey, and beyond as a result of 
weak credibility of the membership perspective. 
Public opinion and discourses
Public opinion in the member states has become increasingly unfavorable to future enlargements of the EU. 
Negative public opinion in the EU member states is a major limiting factor of any future enlargement. It re-
duces the credibility of the EU’s membership promise – in particular, if old member states raise the possibility 
of putting accession treaties to a referendum. As a result, non-member states cannot be sure to join even 
if they comply with the accession conditions. This uncertainty about being ultimately rewarded for reforms 
with membership will diminish the non-members’ readiness to engage in reform. 
The previous absence of an open and fact-based political and public debate on Eastern enlargement, espe-
cially in the older member states, has contributed to fueling anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic sentiments; the 
lack of deliberation and consultation about the process seems to be one of the major concerns of citizens 
in the member states. Elite communication on enlargement has focused too much on material costs and 
benefits, whereas pro-European discourses based on common values, ideals and identities have remained in 
the background. 
The analysis of citizens’ perceptions and understandings in six member and candidate states about the pro-
cess of enlargement presents a far more nuanced and optimistic picture than public opinion surveys, as a 
12 Bruszt, L. and Vukov, V. (2015) ‘Transnationalizing States in Europe’s Peripheries: European Integration and the 
Evolution of Economic State Capacities in the Southern and Eastern Peripheries of Europe’, Journal of Comparative 
Economic Studies 10 (March 2015): 69-92.
13 Medve-Bálint, G. and Bohle, D. (2016) ‘More Integrated but also more Divided: Intended and Unintended Con-
sequences of Foreign Direct Investment and the Cohesion Policy in Eastern Europe’, MAXCAP Working Paper No. 
34, “Maximizing the integration capacity of the European Union: Lessons of and prospects for enlargement and 
beyond” (MAXCAP), Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin.
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number of the discourses we find contain supportive arguments for enlargement. Analyses of public dis-
course show that there are a number of enabling discourses that politicians in favor of enlargement can 
use to communicate with citizens. A large group of discourses contain arguments suggesting that citizens 
would accept enlargement if it was objective, rule driven and transparent. The emphasis on impersonal and 
non-corrupt institutions emerges when citizens define their own expectations from enlargement in the dis-
course analyses. These expectations can be interpreted as support for the EU’s new enlargement strategy 
with its stronger conditionality and emphasis on rule of law.14 
Our analyses suggest that EU member state governments and institutions should approach and engage cit-
izens and grass-roots movements directly in an open and fact-based dialogue at the early stages of the en-
largement process. They should seek a bridging rhetoric that would speak to citizens beyond economic and 
personal benefits and gains, since those are uncertain and change rapidly. Rather emphasis in rhetoric should 
be placed on the shared and common European values, ideals, principles, norms and rules when communi-
cating and debating future steps towards widening. 
The ‘new approach’ and judicial reform
The EU’s enlargement strategy has been adapted time and again to changing circumstances of enlargement 
and lessons learned from earlier accession processes. An important recent innovation has been the ‘new 
approach’ with its focus on the rule of law and judicial reform. Whereas the new approach addresses weak-
nesses of previous enlargement rounds, and addresses core citizens’ concerns about the candidate countries, 
our research shows that it can also lead to unintended consequences. New, relatively autonomous bodies 
tasked with training and regulating the activities of judges may unintentionally enable new forms of political 
manipulation to occur and reinforce conservative practices that serve to undermine the reputation of the 
judiciary.15 Simply supporting judicial councils and academies will not necessarily improve judicial practice 
and deliver more ‘independent’ judgments. Rather, continual monitoring of and intervention in the new 
institutions is likely to be necessary. 
In addition, the ‘new approach’ suffers from sticking to the old top-down, intergovernmental channel of 
accession conditionality. Whereas it is true that strengthening the rule of law requires governance capacity, 
namely robust state and intermediary institutions able to tackle corruption, that civil society has a crucial role 
to play in driving reform and transforming legal norms and practice is incontestable. Civil society actors need 
14 Dimitrova, A.; Kortenska, E. and Steunenberg, B. (2015) ‘Unintended Consequences of EU Conditionality on (Po-
tential) Candidates’, MAXCAP Working Paper No. 13, “Maximizing the integration capacity of the European Union: 
Lessons of and prospects for enlargement and beyond” (MAXCAP), Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin.
 Kortenska, E. (2016) ‘The Limits of EU Enlargement Linked to Citizens’ Perceptions of Past and Future Enlarge-
ments’, MAXCAP Deliverable 3.6, “Maximizing the integration capacity of the European Union: Lessons of and 
prospects for enlargement and beyond” (MAXCAP), Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin.
15 Fagan, A. (2016) ‘Judicial Reform in Serbia and Bosnia-Hercegovina: Is EU Support and Assistance Augmenting 
Independence?’, MAXCAP Working Paper No. 24, “Maximizing the integration capacity of the European Union: 
Lessons of and prospects for enlargement and beyond” (MAXCAP), Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin.
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to be brought into such institutions and to participate in policy development and implementation. This holds 
not only for the Western Balkans but also for the Eastern Partnership countries.16 
Given their capacities and expertise, civil society actors are strongest in the role of monitoring EU integration 
processes related to anti-corruption. The EU should also encourage synergies and coalition building amongst 
local Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). The competition for similar donor sources often discourages the co-
operation among local CSOs, but this should be changed to reflect a more cooperative guiding principle. The 
EU and other international donors should further encourage grassroots CSOs to develop alternative sources 
of funding and ensure that formal and informal anti-corruption networks have a greater geographic spread, 
particularly in rural areas.17  
New geopolitical challenges
Even with a more credible membership promise and an improved strategy for strengthening the rule of law, 
the willingness of elites and the capacity of states to reform appear too weak in many (potential) candidate 
countries to move decisively towards EU membership. The changing geopolitical situation in the region should 
therefore be seen as an opportunity to reconsider the EU’s overall strategy. Challenges such as the Ukraine 
crisis or the refugee crisis could motivate a more security-oriented strategy with a focus on strengthening 
the EU’s borders and making lasting agreements on migration, energy and other vital security issues. This 
scenario would require a mainstreaming and acceleration of enlargement policy as one of the EU’s responses 
to the current migration crisis.18
16 Fagan, A.; Börzel, T. A.; Hafner-Ademi, T.; Lebanidze, B.; Sircar, I. and Stojanoska, B. (2016) ‘Societal Actors, State 
Building and the Rule of Law in the Western Balkans and the Neighbourhood: How Can the EU’s Instruments and 
Strategies Be Strengthened?’, MAXCAP Deliverable 5.4, “Maximizing the integration capacity of the European 
Union: Lessons of and prospects for enlargement and beyond” (MAXCAP), Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin.
17 Ibid.
18 Dimitrova, A. (2016) ‘The EU’s Evolving Enlargement Strategies: Does Tougher Conditionality Open the Door for 
Further Enlargement?’, MAXCAP Deliverable 4.4, “Maximizing the integration capacity of the European Union: 
Lessons of and prospects for enlargement and beyond” (MAXCAP), Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin.
“Maximizing the integration capacity of the European Union: Lessons 
of and prospects for enlargement and beyond” 
The ‘big bang enlargement’ of the European Union (EU) has nurtured vivid 
debates among both academics and practitioners about the consequences 
of ‘an ever larger Union’ for the EU’s integration capacity. The research 
project MAXCAP will start with a critical analysis of the effects of the 2004- 
2007 enlargement on stability, democracy and prosperity of candidate 
countries, on the one hand, and the EU’s institutions, on the other. We 
will then investigate how the EU can maximize its integration capacity for 
current and future enlargements. Featuring a nine-partner consortium of 
academic, policy, dissemination and management excellence, MAXCAP 
will create new and strengthen existing links within and between the 
academic and the policy world on matters relating to the current and 
future enlargement of the EU.
